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Abstract 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIETAL VALUES AND MODELS OF 
DEMOCRACY: EVIDENCE FROM 28 COUNTRIES 
Viktoriia Biliaieva  
Conditions for democratic stability have been an important topic in political science, from 
both theoretical and practical points of view. While some scholars argue that democratic 
stability depends on the institutional design adopted by a specific country, for example 
presidentialism or parliamentarism, others attribute democratic stability to certain types 
of values and political culture. This thesis aims to contribute to the debate on democratic 
stability by examining the relationship between societal values and models of democracy. 
In particular, it seeks to establish whether societal values and democratic models adopted 
in different countries correspond to each other.  
To achieve this aim, this thesis performs several tasks. Firstly, it lays out a theoretical 
framework for studying a link between values and models of democracy based on 
congruence theory. The main idea behind this research is that congruence, that is 
similarity or correspondence, between societal values and democratic features at the 
institutional level is an important factor in ensuring democratic stability. To test whether 
such congruence occurs, this thesis suggests three hypotheses: that self-direction is 
positively linked with liberal democracy, that universalism is positively linked with 
liberal democracy, and that universalism is positively linked with egalitarian democracy.  
Secondly, this thesis presents a research design developed on the basis of the theoretical 
framework to test the suggested hypotheses. In particular, Pearson’s correlations are run 
to see whether an association between values and models of democracy is positive and 
strong. The dataset used in this research consists of 28 countries that were chosen out of 
the countries where the sixth wave of the World Values Survey was conducted based on 
these countries’ scores on the Electoral Democracy Index provided in the Varieties of 
Democracy dataset. Data from these two projects are used in the operationalisation of the 
key concepts: universalism and self-direction (values) and liberal and egalitarian 
democracy. Each of the concepts is measured in two ways: values are measured at a more 
abstract level and a more specific one, and models of democracy are measured using 
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component democracy indices as well as full democracy indices, which are aggregations 
of respective component democracy indices and an Electoral Democracy Index.  
Thirdly, this thesis presents the results of the performed data analysis. It relies on the 
obtained Pearson’s correlation coefficients as well as visualisation of the relationship 
between the variables in the form of scatter plots to make conclusions about this 
relationship. The results of the data analysis are mixed, and while some of the variables 
demonstrate weak / moderate, moderate or even strong association, if outliers are 
removed from analysis, many correlation coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, evidence for the congruence between societal values and models of democracy 
provided in this research is inconclusive.  
Despite such mixed and inconclusive evidence, there is potential for further exploring the 
relationship between societal values and models of democracy. Since this research seems 
to indicate that less abstract values or attitudes demonstrate better correlations with 
models of democracy, one way to proceed with the research on this topic is to apply other 
operationalisations of the value concept. What is more, more specific values might be 
correlated with certain features of democratic models as opposed to models as a whole. 
This might produce better results due to more direct and clear-cut links between such 
variables. In addition, there is potential for exploring differences in congruence in 
established and new democracies. This thesis addresses this question only briefly, but 
there is definitely room for comparative research in this regard, including by using 
qualitative methods and case studies.  
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Introduction 
The relationship between culture and people’s values on the one hand and political 
institutions on the other has become a subject of an important debate in political science. 
In the context of democratisation, the question of whether democracy requires a specific 
institutional setup or rather a specific set of values to succeed and consolidate has been 
seen as crucial, from both theoretical and practical points of view.  
In terms of institutions, the discussion has been centred, for example, around suitability 
of presidential and parliamentary systems for sustainability of democratic regimes. Linz 
(1990), for instance, presented a list of threats that presidentialism poses to democracy. 
While acknowledging possible exceptions, he considered parliamentarism to be more 
conducive to a stable democratic regime. By contrast, Horowitz (1990) argued that what 
is important is whether a political system produces a sharp divide between government 
and opposition, regardless of this system being parliamentary or presidential.   
On the other end of the institutions – culture debate are those authors who have 
underscored the importance of culture and values to establishing and preserving 
democracy. According to Fukuyama (1995), for instance, democracy has to consolidate 
at four different levels: ideology, or normative beliefs, institutions, civil society and 
culture. The two latter levels are deeper and change slowly; thus, these are the levels at 
which the major struggle between liberal democracy and its competitors (e.g. paternalistic 
Asian authoritarianism) takes place. Similarly, while Almond and Verba (1989) 
recognised the importance of elite attitudes and behaviour and political structures, they 
emphasised the role of political attitudes of ordinary citizens in ensuring democratic 
stability. In making their argument, these authors partly relied on congruence theory 
developed by Eckstein. Particularly, they referred to Eckstein’s (1998) hypothesis that 
democratic governments can only perform well if their authority patterns combine 
democratic and non-democratic features. Another core hypothesis within congruence 
theory posits that governments perform well if their authority patterns are congruent, that 
is correspond to or are the same, with the authority patterns characteristic of other social 
units. In addition, it has been argued that socioeconomic development and improved 
economic situation of the populations, in particular in those countries which are referred 
to as Western democracies, has brought about the shift in people’s values. The emphasis 
on survival has been substituted by the focus on the quality of life and self-expression 
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values such as individual liberty, human diversity, civic autonomy etc (Inglehart, 1977; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Self-expression values in turn have been conducive to the 
establishment and consolidation of democratic regimes (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  
Academic discussions of democracy go beyond the debate about its roots and conditions 
for its stability. The concept of democracy as such has been studied extensively, and 
numerous definitions, characteristics and models of democracy have been suggested. 
Democracy can be defined as a system for organising relations in a state in which citizens 
can held rulers accountable and which gives citizens a variety of means to express their 
interests and values (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Lijphart (1999) distinguished between two 
types of democracy: majoritarian, or Westminster, model and consensus model. 
Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning and Teorell (2016) posited that a consensus exists that 
democracy goes beyond mere elections, which has led to the introduction of various 
models that expand electoral definition of democracy and emphasise characteristics such 
as popular participation, social-economic equality, liberal constitutionalism and 
deliberation.  
This master’s thesis is based on several ideas that have been developed in the literature 
on culture, values, democracy and regime stability. It adopts a stance that democracy 
requires certain values to be predominant in a society in order to emerge, consolidate and 
be stable. At the same time, this research intends to explore the relationship between 
democracy and values at a new, deeper, level since the existing research on this topic 
often deals with values that can be labelled as liberal, or self-expression, and their 
contribution to democratisation and does not distinguish between different types or 
conceptions of democracy. Therefore, the aim of this master's thesis is to find out whether 
there is congruence, in other words correspondence or similarity, between various societal 
values and specific models of democracy that exist in different countries, that is whether 
societal values are reflected at the institutional level.  
Particularly, while existing rich and detailed data concerning values have already allowed 
for generalisations regarding trends in political culture (Coppedge, 2012), these data 
could be further used to examine a variety of values and orientations, which correspond 
to different behaviours or states desirable by people, in various countries. What is more, 
it has been argued that most of the existing measures of democracy do not reflect the 
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diversity of models of democracy; in particular, these measures have been criticised for 
their narrow scope, that is primary focus on elections, political institutions, parties and 
elites (Doorenspleet, 2015). As a result, there has been a call for a new multidimensional 
approach to measuring democracy that reflects different conceptions of democracy 
(Coppedge et al., 2011). The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project is based on such 
a new approach and provides a dataset that goes beyond equating democracy with 
elections and aims to measure, through a large number of indicators, seven principles of 
democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian and 
consensual) (Mechkova & Sigman, 2016). Currently the V-Dem dataset contains 5 
democracy indices: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian.  
Thus, the research question that this thesis seeks to answer is the following: What is the 
relationship between societal values and different models of democracy? The main idea 
that underpins this research is that certain values that are widespread or have strong 
support in a society are reflected in a specific type, or types, of democracy that emerges 
in that particular society. The overarching expectation is that there is a positive 
association between societal values and models of democracy. Taking into account the 
available data, this research focuses on three main hypotheses: that self-direction is 
positively linked with liberal democracy and universalism is positively linked with liberal 
democracy and egalitarian democracy.     
If the expected relationship proves to be true, it might not only start to unmask a more 
nuanced association between values and democracy, but also strengthen the overall 
argument for the importance of culture and values for democratic performance and 
stability by demonstrating that there should be correspondence between societal values 
and institutions as opposed to an emphasis on institutional arrangements only. Self-
expression, or liberal, values might be crucial to the establishment of a democratic regime 
and democratic institutions in the first place, which means the introduction of channels 
through which people are able to express their interests and values. In turn, thanks to the 
existence of such channels, overtime more specific types or models of democracy might 
emerge in different societies in accordance with dominant values. More importantly, in 
accordance with congruence theory, the emergence and consolidation of such models in 
the form of different institutions and mechanisms might be a crucial factor in ensuring 
successful democratic performance. The exploration of a possible link between values 
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and models of democracy is therefore not just a matter of an academic debate; it is 
important from a practical point of view when there is a need to design sustainable 
democratic institutions. In addition, although this thesis will not directly solve the 
problem of not taking people’s views on democracy into account, since the V-Dem 
dataset that is used in this research relies on expert knowledge (Doorenspleet, 2015), it 
will contribute to the linking of V-Dem data to surveys that explore people’s opinions. 
Taking into account the research question and the aim of this thesis, it will adopt a large-
N research design in order to answer the research question with more certainty, minimise 
possible errors and allow for generalisation of the findings, even if only modest due to 
the exploratory nature of this research and possible limitations related to the available 
data. In particular, the hypothesis related to self-direction will be tested on 28 democratic 
countries, while the hypotheses that deal with universalism will be tested on 26 countries 
due to missing data. While this research recognises the importance of culture and values 
in ensuring successful institutional performance, it does not exclude a possibility that 
institutions can have an impact on culture and values. Therefore, this research does not 
make a distinction between independent and dependent variables and only checks the 
relationship between variables for correlation, not causality. The data used in this thesis 
come from two big projects: V-Dem project and World Values Survey (WVS), a project 
that is dedicated to the study of changing values by means of using a common 
questionnaire and conducting nationally representative surveys (in waves) in almost 100 
countries in the world (“Who We Are,” n.d.). The software used to carry out this research 
includes Excel, for carrying out simple calculations and finalising the dataset, and Stata 
for producing graphs and running correlations.    
To answer the research question, this thesis performs several tasks, which are reflected in 
the thesis structure. The first chapter introduces the theoretical framework for this 
research: it deals with the main theories related to the topic and explores the main 
concepts used in this research and relations between them. The second chapter lays out 
the methodology of this research: it explains the operationalisation of the key concepts 
and introduces the datasets and methods used to test hypotheses. The third chapter 
presents the results of the undertaken analysis in light of the thesis aim. These chapters 
are followed by a concluding section that briefly summarises the key findings of this 
thesis and offers topics for future research.        
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1. Theoretical Framework: Congruence between Societal Values and Models of 
Democracy 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for studying the relationship between 
values that are widespread in different societies and various models of democracy. It deals 
with the key concepts used in this research as well as some of the theories that have been 
put forward to explain the relationship between these concepts. Based on this discussion, 
this chapter elaborates on the theoretical expectations and hypotheses that are tested in 
the third chapter.     
1.1. Key Concepts 
1.1.1. Democracy and Its Different Conceptions 
Democracy, its essential features and characteristics, and various types of democracy 
have been a subject of extensive research in political science. Lijphart (1999), for 
example, adopted the following basic definition of democracy: it is government by the 
people or, in modern representative democracies, by their representatives; at the same 
time, it is government for the people, that is government according to people’s preferences 
(p. 1). Based on this definition, Lijphart conceptualised two types of democracy: 
majoritarian, or Westminster, model and consensus model, which exhibit important 
differences with regard to specific democratic institutions and rules.     
According to Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 76-80), while there are many types of 
democracy with unique institutional setups, democracy as a system of governance is 
characterised by specific generic features, components and procedures. In particular, in a 
democracy, citizens, who act indirectly through the cooperation and competition of their 
elected officials, can held rulers accountable for their actions. Elections play a central role 
in a democratic system; however, for its proper functioning, democracy requires the 
existence of numerous other channels through which citizens can influence public policy 
and express their interests and values during the periods between elections. Such channels 
include social movements, interest associations, different territorial or functional 
arrangements etc. Furthermore, while majority rule is an integral part of democracy, 
different mechanisms, including interest associations and civil movements, exist to 
protect the rights of minorities.  
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Both of the presented definitions put people or citizens at the centre of a democratic 
system. What makes a system of governance democratic is the availability of mechanisms 
through which citizens can channel their preferences, interests, values etc. The fact that 
democracy is a system responsive to people’s demands constitutes an important premise 
for this thesis: the values that are shared by the majority of people can, therefore, be, at 
least to a certain degree, translated into specific political arrangements.   
While the basic definition of democracy as rule by the people seems to be widely 
accepted, there is no final consensus as to what democracy means, which is reflected in 
the fact that numerous conceptions, or models, of democracy have been developed by 
theorists. Among the key conceptions of democracy that have been put forward by 
different authors are electoral, majoritarian, deliberative, liberal, egalitarian and 
participatory conceptions (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253). These models exhibit the 
following characteristics and features (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253-254): 
- the electoral conception or model of democracy is based on the idea that 
democracy is reached through competition between different leadership groups 
which participate in periodic elections and seek electorate’s support. In this 
model, elections, electoral institutions and procedures, and political parties that 
compete for power are the key elements, while other factors that are important for 
fair and competitive elections (e.g. civil liberties or independent judiciary) are 
viewed as secondary;  
- in the liberal conception of democracy, the following features are crucial: civil 
liberties, transparency, rule of law, horizontal accountability, that is effective 
checks on the rulers, minority rights. Liberal conception is negative in its nature 
since it emphasises the limits placed on the government and procedures which 
ensure that minority and individual liberties are not infringed upon;   
- the majoritarian conception of democracy is based on the idea that the majority is 
sovereign, and that majority’s opinions and preferences must prevail over those 
of a minority. Thus, political institutions in such democracies are centralised and 
power is concentrated. In some respects, this model is opposite to the liberal one: 
it favours majoritarian electoral systems rather than proportional ones, unitary 
rather than federal constitutions etc. At the same time, majoritarian model is 
compatible with human rights, transparency, civil liberties etc;   
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- the participatory conception of democracy is rooted in the direct, non-
representative, model of democracy. This model views direct rule by citizens as 
preferable to delegating power to representatives wherever and whenever 
possible. Apart from voting, party primaries, referenda, citizen assemblies, social 
movements, public hearings and other forms of citizen engagement are of crucial 
importance in this model;    
- the deliberative conception of democracy places emphasis on the process through 
which decisions are made. Deliberation involves reasoning that is focused on 
common good rather than parochial interests or emotional appeals. This model 
requires respectful dialogue among competent participants who are open to 
discussion and are willing to change their opinion if reasonable arguments are 
presented. While different consultative bodies, e.g. panels or hearings, are charged 
with a deliberative function, deliberation must be used at all levels, across all 
institutions and among citizens;  
- the egalitarian conception of democracy strives to achieve equal participation, 
representation and protection, which means that civil liberties and due process are 
exercised by everyone, as well as equal resource distribution (income, healthcare, 
education). The idea behind this model is that resources bring about political 
empowerment. Thus, without more or less equal distribution of resources, or 
social equality, real political equality cannot be achieved.  
While some conceptions might come into conflict with each other, as is the case with 
majoritarian and liberal democracy, in many respects these models are complementary 
(Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 254). What is thus important is that the same country can 
exhibit features of several conceptually distinguishable models of democracy.  
1.1.2. Political Culture, Values and Authority Patterns 
The study of democracy has been linked to the research on political culture and values. 
The concept of political culture was introduced by Almond; he first defined this concept 
as “a particular pattern of orientations to political action” (Almond, 1956, p. 396; Chilton, 
1988, p. 419). In 1963, Almond and Verba published a study dedicated to the civic culture 
and compared it with other types of political culture. 
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According to Almond and Verba (1989), the three major pure types of political culture 
are parochial, subject and participant political cultures. Parochial culture is characteristic 
of societies where there are no specialised political roles, and therefore members of such 
societies do not expect anything from the political system and do not hold any norms that 
would regulate their relation to it. The subject political culture presupposes the awareness 
of the central government and evaluation of it as either legitimate or not. However, the 
subjects are only oriented towards the outputs of the system and do not see themselves as 
active participants in it; therefore, the existing relationship between the political system 
and subjects is very passive. In the participant political culture, members of society are 
oriented towards both inputs into and outputs of the political system and they have a 
vision of self as an active participant in the system. The civic culture is essentially a mixed 
political culture. In the civic culture, participant political orientations are combined with 
parochial and subject orientations in a balanced manner, and activity and involvement 
coexist with passivity.         
Another strand of literature that deals with the relationship between cultural patterns and 
democracy is focused on values. Values can be defined through a set of features that they 
exhibit (Schwartz, 1992, p. 3-4):    
- they are beliefs or concepts;  
- they are linked to desirable states or behaviours;  
- they transcend particular situations, they are general and abstract;  
- they serve as a guide for selecting and evaluating events and behaviours;  
- they are ordered according to their relative importance.  
The content of a value is a specific goal or a motivational concern that is expressed by it. 
Ten broad values have been identified according to underlying motivations, and these are 
recognised across cultures (Schwartz, 1992; Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). These ten values 
include (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, p. 1208): 
- power: social status, control or dominance over other people and resources;   
- achievement: personal success through the demonstration of competence in 
accordance with social standards;    
- hedonism: pleasure, sensuous gratification;    
- stimulation: novelty, excitement, challenges in life;  
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- self-direction: independence in thinking and choosing a course of action, 
creativity, exploration;  
- universalism: understanding, tolerance towards and protection of the welfare of 
all people and nature;  
- benevolence: enhancement of the wellbeing of people with whom one is in close 
and frequent personal contact;   
- tradition: acceptance and commitment to customs, traditional culture and religion;  
- conformity: refraining from actions that are likely to upset others and violate 
social norms;    
- security: safety and stability of society, relations and self.  
These ten values are related in a circular manner. The circle represents a motivational 
continuum divided into four areas: openness to change (self-direction and stimulation), 
self-enhancement (power and achievement), conservation (security, conformity and 
tradition) and self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence); hedonism shares 
elements of openness to changes and self-enhancement, but is closer to the former 
(Schwartz et al., 2014; Vecchione et al., 2015, p. 85). The closer any two values are to 
each other, the more compatible their motivations are; the more distant any two values 
are from each other, the more conflicting their motivations are. The ten broad personal 
values are distinct from core political values (Schwartz et al., 2014). Core political values 
are more specific in nature, they can be defined as “overarching normative principles and 
belief assumptions” about government, society, citizenship. They guide position taking 
in different political environments and situations that would otherwise be confusing. 
Examples of such values include individualism, a sense of equality, belief in the free 
enterprise system etc (McCann, 1992, p. 565).  
Schwartz et al. (2014) identified eight core political values: traditional morality, blind 
patriotism, law and order, free enterprise, equality, civil liberties, foreign military 
intervention, accepting immigrants. According to these authors, more general basic 
personal values underlie and give coherence to more specific and context related core 
political values; therefore, basic personal values play a key role in political choice of 
individuals. What is more, basic personal values have been demonstrated to have a 
considerable effect on political activism, which in turn is viewed as a central issue in 
theories of democracy (Vecchione et al., 2015). 
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Another approach to values has its focus on value change. For example, Inglehart (1977) 
posited that a shift in values, that is basic priorities or basic world views, of Western 
publics has been taking place. According to him, value priorities can be divided into two 
pure groups, with possible mixed types in between: materialist values put emphasis on 
economic stability and maintaining order; post-materialist values, by contrast, emphasise 
freedom of speech and political participation. Conditions of exceptional economic 
security have resulted in lower prioritisation of economic wellbeing and physical security, 
while the quality of life has become more important, which is reflected in the shift from 
materialist to post-materialist values. 
Based on the cases of Great Britain and Germany, the in-depth study of Norway 
(Eckstein, 1966) and then on further research, Eckstein introduced the concept of 
authority patterns. Authority patterns are different processes and structures by which 
social units are directed and governed, and authority relations are the interactions that 
form these patterns. Eckstein emphasised that not only states or its geographic subunits 
are governed and thus exhibit some authority patterns. Other units of society, including 
families, voluntary associations, schools, churches etc, also need to be managed in order 
to exist and last; therefore, these social units, although smaller and less complex than 
states, also require some governance structures and processes. Elements of authority 
patterns are the same in all social units. For example, all social units exhibit certain levels 
of directiveness, which means that activities in social units take place because of 
directives, rather than free will of their members (Eckstein, 1998, p. 5-6). 
In conclusion, this section briefly introduced the concepts of democracy and its models 
as well as political culture, values and authority patterns, which form the broad basis for 
this research. The next section looks in more detail at how democracy, on the one hand, 
and values and political culture, on the other hand, are related. It starts with a broader 
discussion on the role of values in democratisation and then looks into the role of values, 
authority patterns and political culture in democratic performance and stability.  
1.2. Connections between Values, Culture, Authority Patterns and Democracy  
1.2.1. The Role of Values in the Emergence and Consolidation of Democracy 
The concept of values has become central to the strand of literature that views cultural 
change as a source of institutional changes, in particular the emergence and consolidation 
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of democratic institutions. According to Inglehart (1977), along with the value change, 
that is the shift from materialist to post-materialist values, there has been a shift in the 
distribution of political skills. Particularly, ordinary people, in contrast to a narrow group 
of elites, have become interested in and capable of understanding national and 
international politics. The two reinforcing processes of the value change and spread of 
political skills have taken place at an individual level; however, they have had important 
system-level consequences, for instance in terms of changing salience of different 
political issues or relative decline of class conflict. Thus, individual value changes are 
aggregated and translated into broader societal changes at a system, or national, level.    
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) further explored the relationship and causal links between 
economic development, values and democracy. They introduced a revised version of 
modernisation theory which is primarily interpreted in terms of human development, the 
core of which is the expansion of human autonomy and choice. Inglehart and Welzel 
substantiated their theory by conducting an extensive quantitative research using data 
from several World Values Survey and European Values Survey waves and different 
measures of democracy, including the Freedom House civil and political rights scores.    
According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), socioeconomic modernisation, particularly 
economic growth, higher levels of education, better access to information, more 
diversified human interactions, result in an increase in people’s material, social and 
cognitive resources. In this situation, people do not need to focus on survival any longer 
and become more autonomous in their choices. These completely new life experiences 
lead people to prioritise goals that previously were not very important. In cultural terms, 
this represents a major shift towards self-expression values. In particular, emphases shift 
from collective discipline to individual liberty, from group conformity to human 
diversity, from state authority to autonomy of an individual. Self-expression values and 
prioritisation of autonomy and free choice enter different areas of life and change gender 
roles, sexual norms, family values, political participation etc. What is more, self-
expression values are humanistic rather than egocentric, which means emphasis on 
autonomy for everyone, not just oneself.       
Next in Inglehart and Welzel’s sequence (2005) is the impact of culture on institutions. 
While value change occurs at an individual level, the effects of such a change are 
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manifested at a societal level. The new cultural mindset of people, new mass values bring 
about growing demands for civil and political liberties and responsive government, that 
is demands for democratic institutions since these are the institutions that entitle people 
to and protect their free choices. As the demands for democracy become stronger, it also 
becomes more difficult, for political elites for example, to resist the introduction of 
(liberal) democracy. Thus, the spread of self-expression values either results in 
democratisation or allows for democratic institutions to be sustained in case they already 
exist.   
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) made an argument that causal links flow from the self-
expression values, that is culture, to democracy, that is institutions. Thus, their primary 
conclusion is that democracy can only consolidate and be sustained if there is a cultural 
basis for it. A well-designed constitution or elite willingness to rule democratically are 
insufficient for a democracy to survive and thrive in case the support for self-expression 
values is lacking. While having introduced some new aspects to the theory developed in 
collaboration with Inglehart (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), Welzel (2013) overall confirmed 
the sequence in which a change in values results in the introduction of institutions that 
guarantee freedoms and argued that the desire for democracy as such does not lead to 
such institutions unless this desire is grounded in the existence of emancipative values.1    
In conclusion, it has been argued and demonstrated that the improved conditions of living 
in the developed countries allow for a shift in people’s world views. Instead of focusing 
on survival, in new comfortable conditions people start to put emphasis on autonomy, 
freedom of choice and equal opportunities, which have been labelled as self-expression 
or emancipative values. The value change takes place at an individual level since people 
are the ones who start to value and seek new freedoms and rights. As the new values 
become more and more widespread among the members of a society, individual value 
changes lead to the growing public demand for and eventual institutionalisation of 
political and civil rights and other mechanisms to ensure people’s freedom of choice; in 
other words, individual value changes produce a change at a system level. Therefore, 
democracy is the result of individual value changes, which are reflected at the institutional 
                                                          
1 Welzel (2013) argued that the concept of emancipative values is similar to that of self-expression values, 
but has advantages over the latter in terms of theoretical groundness, operationalisation and measurement 
quality.   
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level, or, if democracy has recently been established, its survival depends on whether self-
expression values become dominant, since only institutions or elite’s good will are 
insufficient for a democracy to consolidate and last.  
1.2.2. Congruence Theory: Authority Patterns and Governmental Performance   
Self-expression values might play a crucial role in the establishment of democracy; 
however, the relationship between values and political culture on the one hand and 
democracy on the other can also be seen from a perspective of democratic stability and 
performance. Congruence theory developed by Eckstein (Eckstein, 1966; Eckstein, 1998) 
is an example of a theory that deals with stability of institutions, democratic in particular, 
by utilising the concept of authority patters, which was introduced above.  
Eckstein (1998, p. 14-15) posited that what makes the concept of authority patterns useful 
is the fact that as a variable it is common to both the government and social units, that is 
it is neither external nor internal to the government, but rather shared by the government 
and the environments it operates in. Congruence in turn is a variable that describes how 
the government and other social units are linked. The core hypotheses of Eckstein’s 
theory can be summarised as follows (Eckstein, 1998, p. 3-4):  
- “governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent 
with the authority patterns of other units of society” (p. 4). The more congruent 
these patterns are, the better performance the system has. This concerns the 
performance of any political system, democratic included;  
- “democratic governments perform well only if their authority patterns exhibit 
“balanced disparities” – that is, combinations of democratic and nondemocratic 
traits” (p. 4). This hypothesis is the extension of the first one, and congruence 
remains the condition for successful performance of democracies. What is 
emphasised is that without the display of the specified disparities, the congruence 
condition cannot be satisfied.  
According to Eckstein (1998, p. 10-13), congruence in general terms means that 
something broadly corresponds to or is in agreement with something else. Within his 
theory, Eckstein adopts two definitions of congruence: 
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- “congruence exists if the authority patterns of all social units in a society are 
similar”; 
- “congruence exists if the authority patters of a society exhibit a pattern of 
graduated resemblances.”  
While all authority patterns in a society should have something in common, it is 
unreasonable to expect that they will all be identical. Thus, the second definition of 
congruence pertains to authority patterns of adjacent social units, that is those units that 
have a direct and significant impact on government in terms of serving as recruitment 
and/or socialisation channels into the government (Eckstein, 1998, p. 10-13). The 
hypothesis that democracies should exhibit balanced disparities is related to the fact that 
authority patterns of all social units cannot be identical; this results from the fact that 
some social institutions that are widely experienced by people and are highly 
consequential for their lives are not purely democratic in their nature (e.g. families). 
However, not all combinations of disparities are balanced and thus compatible with 
democracy. Specific combinations of such disparities largely depend on specific 
circumstances of different societies (p. 21).   
In terms of the direction of the link between authority patterns of social units and authority 
patterns of governments, Eckstein (1998, p. 22-25) posited that adaptation towards 
increased congruence occurs towards conformity with authority patterns in the social 
units that are the most resistant to change, which means that less stable units adapt to 
more stables ones. While early socialisation into specific authority patterns (e.g. in a 
family, school) might be crucial due to its persistence, Eckstein did not exclude a 
possibility of adaptation of different social units to governmental authority patters. Thus, 
congruence as a link might run in the direction of either smaller social units or the 
government.   
Successful governmental performance, which constitutes an outcome of congruence 
between authority patterns of governments and authority patterns of other social units, is 
summarised by Eckstein (1998, p. 13) in the form of four interrelated conditions:  
- durability of a polity, which means its persistence over time;   
- civil order, which implies the absence of collective use of coercive actions and 
violence in order to attain public or private goals;    
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- legitimacy, which refers to the extent to which members of a society consider a 
regime that exists in it worthy of support;   
- decisional efficacy, which means the degree to which governments are able to 
make policies and carry them out when responding to political challenges and 
demands.      
In terms of an empirical basis for his theory, apart from the fact that Great Britain, as a 
stable and effective democracy, and German Weimar Republic, as a case of an extremely 
unstable and ineffective one, seem to confirm congruence theory in broad terms, Eckstein 
conducted an in-depth study of Norway, which he considered to be one of the oldest and 
most stable democracies in the world (1998, p. 15-16). According to Eckstein (1998, p. 
17-18), an extraordinary degree of congruence exists among all aspects of Norwegian 
life, from families to trade associations, to the national government. Authority relations 
of all these units are characterised, for instance, by equality and participation. What is 
more, different organisations and associations are very common in Norway; almost all of 
them have constitutions, which are modelled on the democratic structure of the local 
government. In addition, very high numbers of children and youth participate in such 
organisations, which means early socialisation into democratic authority patterns. 
Therefore, Eckstein’s conclusion is that although Norway has numerous social and 
political cleavages, the homogeneity of authority patterns in this society ensures its 
stability.  
Another basis for Eckstein’s theory is a motivational one and is related to what he termed 
“role strains.” According to Eckstein, each individual in a society performs a number of 
different roles related to their profession, family, religious membership as well as political 
participation (for example voting) etc. These roles consist of norms, which might be 
different or similar. The more inconsistency there is between the norms of different roles, 
the more discomfort, or strain, an individual experiences. Congruence of authority 
patterns means that norms of different roles are similar and, therefore, there is less strain 
experienced by individuals, which results in better role performance. This also implies 
easier socialisation into different roles through the reinforcement of similar norms 
(Eckstein, 1998, p. 18-19).     
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In conclusion, congruence theory more generally deals with the performance of any 
government, either democratic or authoritarian. For any government to be successful, its 
authority patterns should resemble authority patterns of other social units, especially those 
units that can significantly influence the government. For democracy it means that, on the 
one hand, all units in a society should have some democratic traits for a democracy to 
last. On the other hand, since some of the social units cannot be fully democratic due to 
their nature, the authority patterns of the government should exhibit certain non-
democratic characteristics. Thus, the main idea behind congruence theory is that 
similarity between features of small-scale private entities and features of a large-scale 
complex system (such as a state) is crucial to the effective performance of the system and 
its stability over time. Individuals themselves might strive for the establishment of such 
congruence since it reduces the strain associated with possible diverging norms of 
different roles and makes navigation between these roles easier. The next chapter 
demonstrates how the concept of congruence can be applied beyond authority patterns to 
values and correspondence between them and models of democracy.  
1.3. Expectations and Hypotheses: Congruence between Values and Political 
Institutions 
Understanding of congruence as a linking variable, which accounts for similarities 
between authority patterns characteristic of different social units and those of 
governments, can be useful for understanding the connections between democratic 
stability and other concepts that have been put forward to explain it; it can serve as an 
overarching link. Eckstein (1998, p. 19-20) himself argued that congruence theory can be 
viewed as a high-order theory and other hypotheses regarding stability of democracy can 
be explained by it. Among such hypotheses is, for example, the connection between 
vibrant civil society and a stable democracy. Eckstein posited that while primary social 
institutions, such as families, are never fully democratic, civil society organisations, if 
they are governed in a democratic way themselves, serve as channels of socialisation into 
democratic behaviour.  
When arguing that mixed civic culture is particularly suitable for a democratic system to 
be stable, Almond and Verba (1989) in part relied on Eckstein’s theory. While they 
recognised that civic culture is not the only democratic political culture (for instance, 
activist political culture is compatible with democracy), civic culture encompasses certain 
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contradictory political attitudes similarly to how democratic systems require a 
combination of contradictions, the balanced disparities, in order to function effectively. 
In particular, governments must keep balance between their ability to make and 
implement decisions (power) and their responsiveness to the demands of citizens. For this 
to occur, citizens should combine an active participant role with passive roles of subject 
and parochial (Almond and Verba, 1989, p. 337-341). Therefore, congruence, in that both 
civic culture and democracy display certain contradictions, democratic and non-
democratic traits, activism and passivity, is what makes mixed civic culture and 
democracy especially compatible.  
The concept of congruence might also be useful in understanding the underlying logic of 
the revised modernisation theory and be complementary to it. While the revised theory of 
modernisation deals with the process of democratisation in a more explicit manner than 
congruence theory, which deals with it only indirectly (Eckstein, 1998, p. 26-29), it can 
be argued that growing public demands for democracy represent growing demands for 
congruence between values held by people and political institutions. Congruence might 
well account for the fact that self-expression values, which emphasise freedom of choice 
and autonomy, result in democracy, that is a system of government which guarantees 
them.  
Therefore, the idea that underlies the research question posed in this thesis is that 
congruence might stretch not just from the smallest social units to the system level, but 
from individual level to the system level, that is government. Specific values, which are 
located within individuals, might serve as a basis for the emergence of specific authority 
patterns, that is relations between two or more people might be governed by principles 
that are based on certain, most probably shared, values. For example, a relationship 
between parents and children in a family, where freedom of choice is respected, might be 
very different from a relationship in a family, where the leader of the family makes all 
decisions. In line with congruence theory, such values should be reflected in the authority 
patterns at different levels of society in order to reduce role strain and bring about stability 
and successful performance of political institutions. This relationship might be expected 
not only in connection with self-expression values and democratisation in broad terms; 
this relationship might encompass different subsets of values and different democratic 
arrangements, which might emphasise not only features related to elections or decision-
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making processes, but also principles that are connected to economic and political 
equality. These different arrangements can be seen as various models of democracy.  
For example, as was mentioned above, Eckstein (1998, p. 17) argued that authority 
relations of different social units in Norwegian society are characterised by equality and 
participation. These particular characteristics might be the result of such values, based on 
Schwartz’s typology, as benevolence (if they concern small social units where everyone 
knows and is closely linked to each other) and/or universalism (if they concern big social 
units where there is no personal interaction between all members). These values, through 
different levels of social units, might be connected to the system level in the form of 
specific democratic arrangements, which emphasise equality and participation. This is 
reflected in a model or models of democracy that are particularly well pronounced in a 
country, in this case Norway.  
A link between congruence of societal values and political institutions on the one hand 
and democratic stability on the other might also be explored through the concepts of 
political efficacy and political trust, which have been viewed as important assets in 
democracies since they contribute positively to democratic process and citizen 
involvement (Lambert, Curtis, Brown & Kay, 1986). Political efficacy consists of internal 
efficacy, that is “beliefs about one’s own ability to influence the political process,” and 
external efficacy, that is “beliefs about the responsiveness of government officials to the 
concerns of the citizenry” (Anderson, 2010, p. 63). Political trust, which is distinct from 
trust in other people, is trust or confidence in government (Anderson, 2010, p. 65). It 
could be argued that the more congruence exists between individual values and principles 
by which society is governed the higher political efficacy and political trust will be due 
to the very similarity of these values and principles, which will eliminate role strain and 
make the functioning of the government easier to understand and accept. 
Therefore, it is plausible to argue that for a democracy to be stable and perform well there 
should be congruence between individual values and the principles on which society’s 
political institutions are based. This means that there should be similarity or 
correspondence between certain features emphasised by democratic arrangements in each 
country and values that are widespread in this society. More support to a specific value is 
expected to go hand in hand with more emphasis on the features that correspond to this 
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value at the institutional level (authority patterns might serve as an intervening variable 
in this relationship). Such features at the institutional level can be summarised as different 
models of democracy.   
Since congruence is a linking variable that connects all levels of society by ensuring 
similarity in how they operate, an important question is that of the direction of 
congruence, that is what levels influence other levels and what levels adapt to this 
influence. The revised modernisation theory, which, as was explained above, can be 
understood from a congruence theory perspective, emphasises the impact of values on 
democracy, while values themselves are considered to be only modestly influenced by 
society’s previous levels of democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 10). In a similar 
vein, Welzel, Inglehart, Alexander and Ponarin (2012) argued that a substantial link exists 
between support for emancipative values and the introduction and consolidation of human 
rights, and that the direction of this relationship goes primarily from values to rights, 
although rights also influence values, however, to a lower degree, and overall values and 
human rights reinforce each other. Congruence theory itself is more explicitly two-
directional since, according to Eckstein (1998, p. 22-25), the relationship can go from 
social units to government and vice versa. This thesis recognises the fact that the possible 
reverse impact of institutions on culture should not be neglected. Therefore, it does not 
presuppose causality in the relationship between values and models of democracy, that is 
that one leads to the other, but only assumes that certain values and certain models of 
democracy coexist, or are likely to coexist.        
Since this research aims to move beyond self-expression values and democratisation and 
taking into account the available data, the focus of this thesis is on two types of values 
identified by Schwartz and other authors, who have worked with him: self-direction and 
universalism. Taking into account what these values mean and what main features 
different models of democracy emphasise, this research focuses on three hypotheses:  
H1. Societies that emphasise self-direction score high on liberal democracy.  
H2. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on liberal democracy. 
H3. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on egalitarian democracy.  
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Self-direction, which places emphasis on independence, seems to be relevant to 
protection of individual rights and liberties, which is one of the key features of liberal 
democracy. Universalism, which presupposes tolerance towards others and protection of 
their welfare, might be relevant, on the one hand, to egalitarian democracy in terms of 
aspirations for more equality in a society and, on the other hand, to liberal democracy in 
terms of protection of minority rights. Apart from seeing whether the connection between 
universalism and liberal and/or egalitarian democracy exists, it might be illuminating to 
see whether this value contributes more to one of the models than the other. What is more, 
it should be noted that societies might value highly different things, and Schwartz’s 
circular model of values allows for compatibility between those values that are located 
close to each other on the circle. In addition, as was mentioned above, most of the models 
of democracy are compatible and the same country might have high scores in several 
democratic models. Therefore, the three hypotheses are not exclusive, but might be 
complementary.   
In conclusion, this chapter explored the main concepts employed in this thesis and 
widened the use of congruence theory to account for the necessary correspondence 
between individual values and different models of democracy in order to ensure 
successful democratic performance and stability. It is expected that values that are 
widespread is a society should be reflected in a model or models of democracy under 
which this society operates, or, alternatively, these models should be reflected in societal 
values, depending on the direction of congruence. Without specifying the direction of the 
relationship, the aim of this thesis is to test whether congruence between values and 
models of democracy takes place.   
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2. Research Design 
This thesis aims to explore the relationship between different types of values and different 
models of democracy and, in particular, see whether congruence occurs between these 
two variables. Thus, it adopts a large-N research design, based on the cases described 
below, which is suitable for uncovering whether an association between variables exists. 
This chapter deals with the operationalisation of the key concepts, data sources, case 
selection and statistical methods used to answer the research question and test suggested 
hypotheses.   
2.1. Data and Measurement 
2.1.1. Data Sources and Case Selection 
The selection of cases for this research was, on the one hand, limited by the data available 
in the employed datasets. On the other hand, the research aim and research question 
placed a limitation on the case selection in terms of the regime types or systems of 
governance. A case in the context of this research is thus a democratic country in a 
particular year (country-year format of the data), for which data on both variables, values 
and models of democracy, are available.  
The two big projects that provided data for this research are V-Dem (models of 
democracy) and WVS2 (values). The V-Dem project’s aim is to offer a new approach to 
measuring democracy, which reflects the complexity of this concept by distinguishing 
between and collecting data to measure seven high-level principles of democracy: 
electoral, liberal, deliberative, participatory, egalitarian, majoritarian and consensual.3 
The headquarters of the project are based at the V-Dem Institute, the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, which is located in Sweden (“About 
V-Dem,” n.d.). The V-Dem team consists of more than 50 social scientists from across 
the globe and works with over 3,000 country experts. The last released V-Dem dataset 
(version 8) covers 201 countries from year 1789 to 2017 (“V-Dem: Global Standards, 
Local Knowledge,” n.d.).  
                                                          
2 A similar undertaking in terms of studying values within Europe has been the European Social Survey. 
For the purposes of this research one dataset, WVS, was used to ensure uniformity of questions and scales 
and, therefore, uniformity of the resulting operationalisations of the concept of values. In addition, using 
the WVS allows to include a wider range of countries from different parts of the world.  
3 The last two principles, majoritarian and consensual are not available at the moment.    
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Overall, the V-Dem dataset includes around 450 specific indicators. These indicators 
pertain to different areas (e.g. elections, political parties etc.) and are mostly coded by 
either V-Dem team members and/or Country Coordinators (in case of the factual 
indicators) or Country Experts (in case data require a greater degree of judgement; 
Country Experts also indicate their confidence for some other indicators). Country 
Experts are academics or professionals working in a specific field; usually, and ideally, 5 
or more experts code each variable. The numerous indicators and variables are in turn 
used to create composite variables, the highest level of which is democracy indices; 
currently five democracy indices are included in the dataset: electoral, liberal, 
participatory, egalitarian and deliberative (Coppedge et al, 2017; Coppedge et al, 2018a; 
Coppedge et al, 2018c). To perform all the necessary operations for carrying out the 
intended research, data from the original V-Dem dataset, version 8 (newest), were used 
(Coppedge et al., 2018b). This dataset was transformed to include only the countries and 
variables necessary for this research (4 democracy indices), and later calculated value 
scores were added to it to create a new dataset for performing statistical analysis.   
The WVS is also global in its scope; it unites social scientists who are studying the impact 
of changing values on political and social life. The WVS Association and its Secretariat 
are headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The WVS started in 1981 and since then nationally 
representative surveys, based on common questionnaires and dedicated to human beliefs 
and values, have been conducted in almost 100 countries containing almost 90 percent of 
the world’s population (“Who We Are,” n.d.). WVS takes place in waves, and so far, six 
waves have taken place: in 1981-1984, 1990-1994, 1999-2004, 1995-1998, 2005-2009, 
2010-2014 (WVS 7 is currently underway). Over the year, the WVS questionnaires have 
included a wide range of questions related to cultural values, attitudes and beliefs of 
people towards different topics and aspects of life. Some of the questions have changed, 
while the others have been used in all surveys (“Questionnaire Development,” n.d.). After 
having identified the wave to be used in the research, the main work in preparing the 
value scores was done by using the file that summarises the results of the wave, which 
will be referred to as the results file in what follows (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 
2015). This file contains percentages of people who chose specific answers to all 
questions across all countries included in the wave.            
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The V-Dem dataset offers very clear-cut indices that are used to measure different models 
of democracy based on characteristic features of these models.4 VWS includes a wide 
range of questions concerning people’s attitudes and beliefs; however, the connection 
between them is less straightforward and these questions had to be examined to identify 
those that could be used to operationalise the concept of values. What is more, the V-Dem 
overall includes more countries than WVS. In addition, while some countries have been 
included in all WVS waves, some countries vary from one wave to another. Therefore, 
the WVS was explored first to see what were the possibilities for operationalisation of the 
value concept and what countries data are available for.  
The fifths and sixth waves of the WVS (“World Values Survey (2005-2009)”, (2015); 
“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015) included questions based on the typology 
developed by Schwartz, which is used in the hypotheses to be tested in this research. The 
fifths wave included 10 questions, while one more question, which seems particularly 
relevant to this research, was added in the sixth wave. Therefore, the selection of the 
countries to be included in the testing of hypotheses was based on the WVS 6 (2010-
2014). Overall this wave included 60 countries.    
The next step in selecting cases for this research was to choose those countries out of the 
60 that satisfy a certain requirement, or meet a threshold, to be called democratic, since 
this research deals with models of democracy. This requirement is based on countries’ 
scores on the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), which is measured in V-Dem.    
The EDI captures Dahl’s concept of polyarchy and is thus measured using the following 
lower-level indices: elected executive index, clean elections index, freedom of expression 
index, freedom of association index, suffrage indicator, each of which in turn consists of 
several indicators. The EDI serves as a foundation for other democracy indices since, 
according to the V-Dem conceptual scheme, a regime cannot be considered democratic 
without elections (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016; Coppedge et al, 
2018a). The EDI from the V-Dem dataset was thus chosen as a threshold, on the one 
                                                          
4 It should be noted that authors, who have been working on the V-Dem project, have conducted both 
extensive theoretical work on the topic of models of democracy and empirical work. This is reflected in the 
fact that works by the same authors are used in this research for developing the theoretical framework as 
well as in the empirical part, which makes operationalisation of the concept of models of democracy rather 
unproblematic.   
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hand, due to elections being viewed as fundamental to the existence of a democratic 
regime and, on the other hand, to ensure consistency in how different models of 
democracy are conceptualised and measured.   
The EDI runs from 0 to 1 (Lührmann et al, 2017). For example, in 2016 Armenia scored, 
approximately, 0,393 on the EDI, while Belgium’s score was 0,858 (Coppedge et al, 
2018b). Initially, the range from 0 to 1 was divided into three parts that correspond to 
high (from 0.67 to 1), average (from 0.33 to 0.67) and low (from 0 to 0.33) EDI, and the 
idea was to select out of the 60 countries from the WVS 6 those that have high EDI scores 
in the survey year. In addition, to ensure that there has been continuity in a country’s 
scoring high on the EDI, as opposed to a one-time high score, scores for three consecutive 
years before and three consecutive years after the WVS 6 was conducted in each country 
were also checked. After checking the 60 countries against this requirement, it was 
decided to lower the EDI threshold to 0.55, which implies that a country is closer to a 
democratic regime in terms of elections, due to several reasons.   
Firstly, this selection included a lot of established democracies; thus, it seemed plausible 
that they might have rather high, and similar, scores in both egalitarian and liberal 
democracy. Lowering the threshold allowed to include more recent democracies (in 
particular, based on their EDI scores, Colombia, Ecuador, Georgia), which, supposedly, 
had lower scores in different models of democracy. Thus, this allowed to increase 
variation on this variable, as well as value variable, which is important for applying 
statistical methods in order to check relationships between variables for correlations. 
Secondly, inclusion of new democracies is interesting from a theoretical point of view in 
terms of checking whether congruence theory can be applied to them alongside 
established democracies. If congruence between values and models of democracy as such 
proves to be taking place and be an important characteristic of established, and therefore 
stable, democracies, it could potentially be used in the research on new democracies as a 
predictor of their stability and success. This research, however, is concentrated on 
congruence in general and includes both established and new democracies in one dataset 
to increase variation on variables.   
The final sample includes a variety of countries from different continents. Although the 
threshold was lowered, in most cases countries have scores higher than 0.6 during the 7-
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year period, including in the year when surveys were conducted. The one noticeable 
exception to the 0.55 rule is Columbia, which had a score of 0.536 three years before the 
survey. However, after that this country has been demonstrating scores that meet and 
exceed the threshold; therefore, it was kept in the final sample. Table 1 shows the EDI 
scores of the selected countries in year when the WVS 6 in these countries was conducted 
as well as scores for three consecutive years before and three consecutive years after the 
survey year.         
Table 1. Selected countries’ Electoral Democracy Index scores 
Country EDI/3 
years 
before 
EDI/2 
years 
before 
EDI/1 
year 
before 
EDI/survey 
year 
EDI/1 
year 
after 
EDI/2 
years 
after 
EDI/3 
years 
after 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Argentina 0.773 0.782 0.791 0.779 0.782 0.780 0.758 
Australia 0.889 0.905 0.911 0.911 0.907 0.880 0.881 
Brazil 0.889 0.877 0.874 0.865 0.856 0.779 0.749 
Chile 0.873 0.878 0.881 0.886 0.906 0.894 0.866 
Colombia 0.536 0.590 0.632 0.647 0.646 0.642 0.641 
Cyprus 0.847 0.845 0.852 0.856 0.860 0.847 0.838 
Germany 0.905 0.903 0.902 0.897 0.879 0.865 0.863 
Ecuador 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.663 0.642 0.647 0.641 
Spain 0.858 0.861 0.862 0.863 0.885 0.839 0.843 
Estonia 0.881 0.873 0.879 0.890 0.894 0.898 0.897 
Georgia 0.575 0.572 0.659 0.717 0.708 0.714 0.737 
Ghana 0.746 0.774 0.774 0.759 0.696 0.691 0.659 
India 0.703 0.684 0.680 0.673 0.664 0.662 0.601 
Japan 0.845 0.845 0.851 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.824 
South 
Korea 
0.849 0.785 0.759 0.758 0.758 0.750 0.727 
Mexico 0.679 0.698 0.684 0.679 0.660 0.651 0.660 
Netherlands 0.858 0.877 0.885 0.888 0.865 0.867 0.864 
New 
Zealand 
0.881 0.894 0.886 0.887 0.896 0.888 0.886 
Peru 0.775 0.751 0.770 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.776 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Poland 0.889 0.889 0.892 0.912 0.878 0.869 0.862 
Romania 0.680 0.686 0.699 0.690 0.687 0.692 0.709 
Slovenia 0.846 0.872 0.879 0.867 0.850 0.865 0.865 
Sweden 0.917 0.917 0.920 0.920 0.925 0.913 0.916 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
0.765 0.745 0.745 0.771 0.783 0.783 0.754 
Taiwan 0.807 0.790 0.776 0.812 0.768 0.775 0.775 
Uruguay 0.916 0.919 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.911 0.909 
United 
States 
0.903 0.894 0.904 0.924 0.928 0.923 0.920 
South 
Africa 
0.797 0.784 0.783 0.773 0.766 0.734 0.729 
Source: prepared by the author by selecting relevant scores form the V-Dem dataset, 
version 8 (Coppedge et al, 2018b)  
In conclusion, the empirical part of this research and preparation of the dataset to be used 
to test hypotheses formulated based on the theoretical framework started with exploring 
the WVS data to identify questions that could be used to operationalise the value concept. 
The WVS 6, which included questions based on Schwartz’s typology, was chosen to be 
used in the analysis and as a basis for further case selection. In the next stage, out of the 
60 countries that participated in the WVS 6, 28 countries with EDI scores above 0.55 
were selected. To ensure that those countries that are included in the dataset have 
experienced some democratic stability, countries’ EDI scores were checked for seven 
years, with the survey year being in the middle of this period. Such an approach allowed 
to include in the analysis a variety of countries from different continents, and not just 
established democracies, but also new ones. This is expected to provide enough variation 
on the variables for conducting correlation analysis and give some preliminary insights 
into whether there might be differences in how congruence works in new and established 
democracies.                    
2.1.2. Operationalisation of Models of Democracy 
As was previously mentioned, the V-Dem dataset currently provides scores in five models 
of democracy: electoral, discussed in the previous subsection, liberal, egalitarian, 
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participatory and deliberative. The highest level of aggregation of different indicators is 
the five democracy indices, which represent high-level, or “full” democracy, indices or 
thick versions of different democracy models. The EDI stands as such an index on its own 
and also serves as a basis for other indices due to the importance of elections for 
democracy (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016; Coppedge et al, 2018a). 
Since the hypotheses developed within this research deal with liberal and egalitarian 
models of democracy, only these two indices are discussed in what follows. These indices 
consist of the following components (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016; 
Coppedge et al, 2018a):  
- Liberal Democracy Index (LDI): EDI and Liberal Component Index (LCI);   
- Egalitarian Democracy Index (EgDI): EDI and Egalitarian Component Index 
(EgCI). 
Respective component indices represent thin versions of different democracy models and 
include the main attributes of a particular model, which minimises their overlap with other 
principles (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning & Teorell, 2016, p. 581). Component indices 
of the selected models are based on the following indices and/or indicators (Coppedge et 
al, 2018a; Lührmann et al, 2017): 
- LCI: equality before the law and individual liberties (in turn this includes, for 
example, transparent laws with predictable enforcement, freedom from torture, 
freedom of religion, freedom of foreign movement etc), judicial constraints on the 
executive (executive respects constitution, high court independence, lower court 
independence etc), legislative constraints on the executive (legislature questions 
officials in practice, executive oversight etc);    
- EgCI: equal protection index (social class equality in respect for civil liberties, 
social group equality in respect for civil liberties, weaker civil liberties 
population), equal access index (power distributed by gender, power distributed 
by socioeconomic position, power distributed by social group), equal distribution 
of resources (educational equality, health equality etc);   
Since V-Dem dataset distinguishes between high-level democracy indices and component 
indices, the main question regarding the operationalisation of the models of democracy is 
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whether to use one or the other to measure these models. The use of the component indices 
seems more appropriate due to a number of reasons.  
Firstly, the EDI is used to select countries for this research in order to ensure that they are 
democratic or closer to a democratic type of regime. The selected countries already have 
high or relatively high (higher than 0.55 and higher than 0.6 for the survey year) scores 
on the EDI and the main focus of the research is on the features of democracy, which are 
added on top of the electoral democracy, that is features which allow to distinguish 
between different democratic models.  
Secondly, in theory, a country can score high on a component index, but have a low score 
on the EDI, which means this country would not score very high on the full democracy 
index, and overall the highest level of realisation of a certain model of democracy can 
only be achieved if a country has high scores in both electoral democracy and specific 
component pertaining to this model (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning and Teorell (2016); 
Lührmann et al, 2017). Therefore, since the countries included in this research already 
have high or relatively high EDI scores, using high-level democracy indices, which 
include EDI scores within themselves, might be tautological and redundant for the 
purposes of this research. Using narrower component indices, untainted by the EDI, is 
expected to have a stronger association with different values. However, it should be 
acknowledged that EDI scores of various countries differ, sometimes to a large extent, 
which means that the use of the full indices might allow to account for these differences 
in electoral democracy scores. Therefore, to test the assumption about better correlations 
of values with component indices, the relationship between high-level indices and values 
will be tested as well.       
In conclusion, the V-Dem dataset provides very straightforward indices to measure 
different models of democracy. In line with the specified hypotheses, two models are 
dealt within this research: liberal and egalitarian. The two models of democracy are 
operationalised by using component democracy indices, which seems to be preferable, as 
well as full democracy indices, which correspond to these models. Therefore, for each 
hypothesis, two models were tested: correlation between a component index and a 
respective value and correlation between a full democracy index and a value. The indices, 
component and full ones, as well as the EDI, are measured in interval scale and run from 
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0 (total absence of a democracy model or component) to 1 (full presence) (Coppedge et 
al, 2018a; Lührmann et al, 2017).  
2.1.3. Operationalisation of Values 
To operationalise and measure the value variable the data from the WVS 6 are used. As 
was mentioned before, initially different WVS waves were screened to identify the 
questions to operationalise values. While both the fifth and sixth waves of the WVS 
included questions based on Schwartz’s typology of values, the WVS 6 included an 
additional one that is relevant to this research.   
In line with the aim of moving from the relationship between self-expression values and 
overall democratisation, the two values from Schwartz’s typology that are dealt with in 
this research are self-direction and universalism. The WVS 6 results file (“World Values 
Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 139-170) includes 11 questions labelled as “Schwartz,” 
and these questions are presented in a uniform manner: “Now I will briefly describe some 
people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that 
person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like 
you?” This formula is followed by a specific statement that is supposed to grasp a certain 
value. Another choice was “a little like me,” and apart from these six options, 
“inappropriate,” “no answer,” or “don’t know” could be coded as well. 
Out of the 11 questions, the statement “It is important to this person to think up new ideas 
and be creative; to do things one’s own way” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, 
p. 139) clearly represents self-direction, which puts emphasis on independence of 
thinking and action. The statement “Looking after the environment is important to this 
person; to care for nature and save life resources” (p. 165) represents part of the definition 
of universalism, which deals with both protection of nature and protection of people’s 
welfare. However, this part of the definition of universalism is not used in this research 
since it seems to be less relevant for the definition of different models of democracy.  
The statement used in the operationalisation of universalism reads as follows: “It is 
important to this person to do something for the good of society” (“World Values Survey 
(2010-2014),” 2015, p. 151). The way in which the questions are ordered implies that this 
statement might be used to represent benevolence together with the statement “It is 
important to help people living nearby; to care for their needs” (p. 154). However, two 
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factors influenced the choice of this question to operationalise universalism. First of all, 
benevolence and universalism are part of the same group of values, self-transcendence, 
and they are located next to each other on the motivational circle of values, which means 
they are highly compatible in terms of their motivation. What is more, benevolence is 
directed towards people a person is in close contact with, while the statement refers to the 
society, a group much broader than close people, which is a feature of universalism that 
focuses on the welfare of all people.       
Overall, the typology developed by Schwartz is useful because it allows broad 
generalisations and comparisons and offers the most basic distinction between different 
groups of values. However, this also implies that this typology is very general and value 
categories are very broad and encompass many distinct attitudes. This is, for example, the 
case with universalism, which is related to both people and nature. Due to such a broad 
scope, universalism seems relevant to both liberal and egalitarian democracy. Therefore, 
while keeping the main hypotheses of this research in the format presented above, three 
additional questions (one question per hypotheses) that are less abstract and narrower in 
their scope, to different degrees, but represent important features of universalism and self-
direction, were chosen to test whether there might be correlations between these attitudes 
and models of democracy. This allowed to include in the analysis attitudes that are more 
directly linked to different characteristics of the models of democracy and make a clearer 
distinction between attitudes that can contribute to them.    
The question chosen to complement the self-direction hypothesis is the following: “Many 
things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please 
tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of 
democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of 
democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”: Civil 
rights protect people from state oppression” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, 
p. 310). Protection of civil rights seems to be related to the emphasis on independence 
and it constitutes an important characteristic of a liberal model.   
The question used to complement the hypothesis on the relationship between 
universalism and liberal democracy reads as follows: “Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be 
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especially important?: Tolerance and respect for other people” ((“World Values Survey 
(2010-2014),” 2015, p. 25). This quality was either mentioned or not mentioned by a 
respondent, who was presented with a list of qualities and had to choose several of them. 
Universalism presupposes tolerance towards all people, which might be the basis for 
protection of rights of minority groups and equality before the law of all people, which 
are important features of liberal democracy.    
The complementary question to the hypothesis on the relationship between universalism 
and egalitarian democracy is: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. 
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and 
if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. 
“Incomes should be made more equal” vs. “We need larger income differences as 
incentives for individual effort” (“World Values Survey (2010-2014),” 2015, p. 203). 
This question pertains to universalism in that it deals with the welfare of people in terms 
of income, and equal distribution of resources is an important characteristic of egalitarian 
democracy. For the purposes of conciseness, the values and attitudes measured by the 
three complementary questions are referred to as civil rights, tolerance and income 
equality.     
To measure how much emphasis different societies put on different values, that is how 
much support there is for a certain value or attitude in a society, net support scores for 
each value were calculated: from the percentage of people who support a value the 
percentage of people who are opposed to it was deducted. In comparison to only 
calculating the percentages of people who support certain values, this approach seems to 
offer certain advantages. In particular, rather high support levels might be accompanied 
by almost as high levels of opposition to a certain value. Net scores show the difference 
between these diverging views, and thus demonstrate how much more support than 
opposition to a value there is in a society, which might be more important for the actual 
realisation of the value at the institutional level than just support. In addition, middle 
answers, which might approximately mean the same as “I don’t know,” were not included 
in score calculations. These answers are rather neutral and demonstrate the absence of a 
strong opinion on a specific value, while the idea is to measure real support for values. 
People who choose such answers might be less concerned about the institutionalisation 
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of certain values or, alternatively, might be influenced by values embodied in the 
institutions to a lesser degree. The exception to this calculation logic is the question about 
tolerance towards other people. Respondents had to choose several qualities children 
should be taught out of a number of options, and a specific quality was either mentioned 
or not. Those who chose the quality definitely support tolerance, while those who did not 
might have an ambiguous attitude towards it, but not necessarily negative. Therefore, the 
resulting net support score shows the prevalence of those who support tolerance over both 
those who do not support it at all and those who do not have a strong opinion on this 
value.          
To calculate the net support scores for universalism and self-direction, percentages of 
people who answered “very much like me” and “like me” were added up, and from this 
number percentages of people who answered “not like me” and “not at all like me” were 
deducted. The two middle categories “somewhat like me” and “a little like me” were 
omitted in line with the logic presented above; in addition, these two options are 
formulated in a vague manner and seem rather close to each other, which makes a choice 
between them difficult. The results file does not include data on Spain for universalism 
variable, and almost 50 % of responses from Germany were coded as “no answer”; 
therefore, these two countries are not included in the analysis of the relationship between 
universalism and models of democracy.      
For calculating the net support scores for civil rights, percentages of people who answered 
8, 9 and 10 (on a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 means civil rights are an essential 
characteristic of democracy) were added up, and from this number percentages of people 
who answered 1, 2 and 3 were deducted. The net support scores for tolerance were 
calculated by deducing the percentage of people who did not mention this quality from 
the percentage of respondents who mentioned it. The net support scores for income 
equality were calculated by adding up percentages of people who chose 1, 2 and 3 (on a 
scale where 1 means complete agreement with making incomes more equal), and from 
this sum percentages of people who chose 8, 9 and 10 were deducted (10 means complete 
support for the larger income differences). Since democracy indices run from 0 to 1, the 
obtained net support scores in percentages were divided by 100% to use the uniform scale 
for both variables. In the rest of the text, these rescaled variables continue to be referred 
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to as net support scores. Table 2 (p. 39) summarises the questions used in the 
operationalisation of values and methods of calculation of the net support scores.  
Table 2. Operationalisation of values 
Value  Statement in the question   Net support score, % 
Self-direction  It is important to this person to think 
up new ideas and be creative; to do 
things one’s own way 
(“very much like me” + “like 
me”) – (“not like me” + “not at 
all like me”)   
Civil rights protect people from state 
oppression (civil rights) 
(8 + 9 + 10) – (1 + 2 + 3); scale 
from 1 to 10, where 10 means 
essential characteristic of 
democracy  
  
Universalism  It is important to this person to do 
something for the good of society 
(“very much like me” + “like 
me”) – (“not like me” + “not at 
all like me”)   
Tolerance and respect for other 
people (tolerance)  
“mentioned” – “not mentioned” 
“Incomes should be made more 
equal” vs. “We need larger income 
differences as incentives for 
individual effort” (income equality) 
(1 + 2 + 3) – (8 + 9 + 10); scale 
from 1 (completely agree with 
“Incomes should be made more 
equal”) to 10 (completely agree 
with the opposite statement) 
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of the results file from WVS 6 (“World Values 
Survey (2010-2014),” 2015)  
In conclusion, universalism and self-direction are operationalised in two ways. First of 
all, the questions based on Schwartz’s typology of values available in the WVS 6 are 
used. This operationalisation is very abstract, in line with Schwartz’s definition of values. 
Furthermore, three additional questions which are, to varying degrees, more specific, but 
are related to the overall abstract values are used. The more specific values and attitudes 
might be more closely correlated with models of democracy since the connections 
between them and the characteristics of these models are more direct and easier to 
establish, while abstract values allow for different interpretations since they encompass 
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many different features. For all values, net support scores were calculated to measure how 
much more support for a specific value there is in a society in comparison to the 
opposition to this value, and these net scores were rescaled to run from 0 to 1 to match 
the democracy indices.   
2.2. Methods: Measuring Correlation 
As was explained in the chapter on the theoretical framework for this research, due to the 
fact that institutions might have an impact on values as well, this exploratory study does 
not seek to establish causality in the relationship between values and models of 
democracy, but rather looks at whether there is association, or correlation, between these 
two variables. In line with congruence theory, the expectation is that the more support 
there is in a society for a specific value, the more pronounced a related model of 
democracy is at the institutional level; at the same time, a lack of support for a value is 
accompanied by an absence or only minor realisation of it at the institutional level. In 
other words, the expected relationship is positive: the higher the net support score for a 
specific value is, the higher should be the respective democracy index score of a particular 
country.   
Since both variables are continuous, that is they can take any value between 0 and 1, 
Pearson’s correlation (r) is used to measure an association between them. Pearson’s 
correlation produces a coefficient that shows the strength of an association between 
variables and its direction. This coefficient can take values from +1 (perfect positive 
relationship) to -1 (perfect negative relationship), with 0 meaning there is no relationship 
between variables. The interpretation of the strength of correlation coefficients might 
differ. In this research, the following scheme is adopted: 0.00 - 0.19 – very weak; 0.20 - 
0.39 – weak; 0.40 - 0.59 – moderate; 0.60 - 0.79 – strong; 0.80 - 1.0 – very strong. The 
hypotheses suggested in this research will be confirmed if the coefficients show that the 
relationship between values and models of democracy is strong and positive, which will 
mean that congruence between values and institutions indeed occurs to a large extent 
across all, or almost all, cases.  
In addition to presenting Pearson’s correlation coefficients, descriptive statistics on how 
countries perform on different indices and measures are provided in the next chapter. This 
allows to take a closer look at potential outliers and provides some insights into the 
41 
 
differences between established and more recent democracies. However, it should be 
mentioned that this is done only briefly since this research is mostly interested in the 
overall relationship between values and models of democracy and does not intend to go 
deeper into the exploration of single cases.   
In terms of the software used, firstly, all the necessary indices and measures were gathered 
in one Excel file, where simple calculations (like additions and deductions for value 
scores) were carried out in order to finalise the dataset. This dataset was then imported 
into Stata statistical software, where all the graphs and correlation coefficients were 
produced. 
2.3. Limitations of Research Design 
Some of the limitations related to the outlined research design have been addressed in the 
sections above. However, since these limitations might influence the results of hypothesis 
testing, they are spelled out in a concise manner in this section. Three factors are 
particularly important in this regard.  
First of all, the available data has put limitations on the case selection. The WVS includes 
a limited number of countries per wave; therefore, not all democratic countries in the 
world are included in the dataset compiled for the purposes of this research. The European 
Social Survey could provide data for additional democratic countries from Europe, which 
would widen the sample; however, the two surveys measure the value variable in different 
ways, which makes combining the two a complicated process.    
Secondly, while inclusion of both established democracies and new democracies, which 
might have lower scores on the EDI, allows to increase variation on variables, it might 
also lead to weaker correlations between them. While this could be a topic for a separate 
research, a certain period of time might be required for congruence to occur. Thus, 
theoretically, new democracies might show lower levels of congruence, which will 
influence the overall relationship between the variables. The question of differences in 
value and democracy scores between established and new democracies will be addressed, 
at least partly, in the section on descriptive statistics, when countries’ scores on different 
indices are presented.       
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Thirdly, operationalisation of the value concept might place certain limitations on 
hypothesis testing. The main conceptual scheme used in this research, Schwartz’s 
typology, has both advantages and disadvantages to its utilisation, which was addressed 
in the section on the operationalisation of values. While certain perceived disadvantages 
might be mitigated by employing additional questions to test hypotheses, other 
operationalisations of value variables are possible, for example combination of different 
questions into indices, which could be done at different levels of abstraction or with more 
reliance on finding questions that are directly related to features of different models of 
democracy.    
It should also be pointed out that although in the analytical part of this research specific 
countries are referred to as examples of certain patterns and some differences between 
established and new democracies are discussed, this discussion could be (and should be) 
developed further in future research on the topic. This research touches upon these themes 
only briefly.     
In conclusion, this chapter presented the data sources used to operationalise values and 
models of democracy, explained the logic behind the measurement of these concepts and 
elaborated on the case selection process, which resulted in producing a dataset consisting 
of all the indices necessary for carrying out the intended research. The next chapter 
presents the results of testing the suggested hypotheses by applying Pearson's correlation 
to the cases in this dataset. 
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3. Data Analysis and Results: Relationship between Values and Models of 
Democracy 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis conducted in accordance with the 
research design laid out in the previous chapter. Firstly, this chapter provides descriptive 
statistics on how countries included in the dataset perform on different indices used in 
this research and briefly looks into how the scores of new and established democracies 
differ. Secondly, it discusses the results of testing the suggested hypotheses and identifies 
some of the countries that stand out as outliers, that is countries that demonstrate 
significant deviation from the overall pattern of the relationship between variables. 
Thirdly, it summarises the results of hypothesis testing in order to answer the research 
question and provides possible explanations for the received outcomes.         
3.1. Descriptive Statistics: Countries’ Scores on the Selected Indices 
3.1.1. Democracy Indices 
This research deals with two models of democracy: liberal and egalitarian. As was 
mentioned in the chapter on research design, both full democracy indices and component 
indices are used in testing hypotheses. Figure 1 (p. 44) shows countries' scores on the LCI 
and Figure 2 (p. 45) – countries' scores on the EgCI (p. 40).5 
The scores on the LCI range from 0.419 to 0.973 and on the EgCI from 0.455 to 0.969. 
Apart from Ecuador’s LCI score (0.419), Figure 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate that there is 
more variation on the EgCI, and that scores are in general higher on the LCI, which might 
suggest that liberal democracy characteristics (protection of civil rights and check and 
balances between different institutions) are seen as more essential to democracy overall 
than equality in the distribution of recourses emphasised by egalitarian model.  
Sweden scores the highest on both components. Other countries with high scores in both 
indices include the Netherlands, Germany and Australia. The USA has a high score on 
the LCI, while its score on the EgCI is located in the middle of the graph. Post-Soviet 
Estonian has a very high score on the LCI, and a rather high score on the EgCI. Post-
communist Poland is located in the middle of the graphs on both indices. Ecuador and 
Georgia, which had EDI scores less than 0.6 before the survey year, predictably have the 
                                                          
5 For the purposes of creating graphs, the democracy scores were rounded to three decimals to ensure 
readability. 
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lowest scores on the LCI (together with Mexico), although Ecuador’s score is 
significantly lower; at the same time, Argentina’s score on the LCI is close to that of 
Georgia’s, although Argentina has had more experience with democracy. Mexico, whose 
EDI score in the survey year is 0.679, also has a low score on the LCI and the lowest 
score on the EgCI.   
Figure 3 (p. 45) demonstrates countries' scores on the LDI and Figure 4 (p. 46) – countries' 
scores on the EgDI. However, since it is expected that component indices might be a 
better measure of the models of democracy for the purposes of this research, which was 
explained above, full indices are only discussed briefly. Overall, the LDI and EgDI scores, 
which are aggregated by combining the EDI scores and respective democracy component 
scores, are lower than component scores, but the situation differs depending on the 
country, which suggests that in some cases the EDI influences the full democracy index 
positively and in some negatively. Sweden again has the highest scores in both cases, 
with the Netherland, Australia and Germany also being in the top on both. Mexico and 
Colombia have low scores on both indices, and Ecuador has the lowest score on the LDI.    
 
Figure 1. Liberal Component Index scores 
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b), and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)     
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Figure 2. Egalitarian Component Index scores 
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)     
  
 
Figure 3. Liberal Democracy Index scores 
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)     
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Figure 4. Egalitarian Democracy Index scores  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)         
3.1.2. Value Scores 
To operationalise values, this research relies on five different questions from the WVS 6. 
Figure 5 (p. 47) demonstrates countries’ net support scores for self-direction. The scores 
run from -0.043 to 0.695. The lowest score belongs to Japan, and since it is negative, it 
means that there is more opposition to self-direction than support. South Korea and 
Taiwan have very low net support scores for self-direction as well. While these three 
countries might share certain cultural characteristics, which determine such low scores, 
the low score of the Netherlands, an established Western democracy, looks surprising. 
The USA, Germany and Australia also demonstrate low net support scores for self-
direction, while Georgia’s score is slightly higher. Estonian’s score is very low, while 
Poland and Romania exhibit higher net support scores for self-direction. The highest net 
support scores for self-direction are exhibited by Ghana and Cyprus; these countries are 
followed by Ecuador, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia.     
Figure 6 (p. 48) shows countries’ net support scores for universalism. As was mentioned, 
the scores for Germany and Spain are not available. Like in the case of self-direction, 
Japan demonstrates the lowest negative score; South Korea’s score is also negative. 
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Taiwan’s net support score for universalism is rather significantly higher than that of 
Japan and South Korea. The Netherlands and the USA have low scores, as does Sweden 
in this case. Out of the six countries with the net support scores for universalism higher 
than 0.7, four countries score high on self-direction as well: Trinidad and Tobago, 
Colombia, Cyprus, Ghana; Georgia and Brazil also have high net support scores for 
universalism.  
Figure 7 (p. 48) shows countries’ net support scores for civil rights. Here, the picture is 
different. Sweden has the highest score, and Germany and the Netherlands are also closer 
to the top of the list. Estonia has the second highest score and is followed by Romania 
and Poland. Japan has a middle low score in this case as opposed to the lowest scores in 
self-direction and universalism. The lowest and negative score is demonstrated by India, 
which is followed by Colombia.     
 
Figure 5. Net support scores for self-direction  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
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Figure 6. Net support scores for universalism   
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
 
Figure 7. Net support scores for civil rights  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
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Figure 8 (p. 49) presents countries’ net support scores for tolerance. Two countries have 
negative scores, South Korea and Argentina. Japan and Germany have rather low scores. 
The USA has an average score, while Sweden demonstrates the highest net support score 
for tolerance, and is followed closely by Australia, the Netherlands and Estonia. 
Colombia has the second highest score. Georgia and Romania exhibit relatively low net 
support scores for tolerance.   
Figure 9 (p. 50) demonstrates countries’ net support scores for income equality. The 
variation on these scores is the largest, since 12 countries have negative net support 
scores, implying that there is more opposition to income equality than support in these 
countries. The USA, Poland, Georgia, Taiwan, Ghana all have negative scores with 
Trinidad and Tobago exhibiting the lowest support for income equality. Sweden and 
Australia demonstrate slightly more support than opposition to income equality, while 
Estonia, Cyprus, Slovenia and Chile have the highest scores.           
 
Figure 8. Net support scores for tolerance  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
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Figure 9. Net support scores for income equality  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)        
In conclusion, the democracy scores are to a certain degree consistent with the expectation 
that established democracies should score higher on them. This seems to be demonstrated 
to a larger extent by the liberal model, where, for example, the USA scores high, while 
its score in egalitarian democracy is lower. The value scores exhibit some interesting 
patterns. For example, the Netherlands or Australia do not score high on abstract self-
direction and universalism, while their scores on less abstract net support for civil rights 
and tolerance are higher. Ecuador, in contrast, scores high on abstract values, but its 
scores on more specific attitudes are low. This might be related to the very broad nature 
of concepts such as self-direction and universalism, which is why less abstract concepts 
are included in this analysis. At the same time, a possible explanation for this could lie in 
the democratic experience itself. The longer the country has been democratic, the more 
familiar its citizens might be with democracy and thus be better aware of its different 
characteristics and underlying attitudes that they come to value. The next section will 
demonstrate whether less abstract attitudes are more strongly correlated with the models 
of democracy than abstract values. 
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3.2. Correlations between Values and Models of Democracy 
3.2.1. Liberal Democracy and Self-Direction 
To test the hypothesis for the relationship between liberal democracy and self-direction 
(H1. Societies that emphasise self-direction score high on liberal democracy) Pearson’s 
correlations were run for these combinations of variables and the results are the following:  
- net support for self-direction and LCI: the result is not statistically significant (p 
< 0.0859,6 Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) = -0.3305);   
- net support for self-direction and LDI: the result is not statistically significant (p 
< 0.1507, r = -0.2788);   
- net support for civil rights and LCI: there is a moderate positive correlation 
between net support for the statement “Civil rights protect people from state 
oppression” as an essential characteristic of democracy and the Liberal Component 
Index (p < 0.0034, r = 0.5346*);     
- net support for civil rights and LDI: there is a moderate positive correlation 
between net support for the statement “Civil rights protect people from state 
oppression” as an essential characteristic of democracy and the Liberal Democracy 
Index (p < 0.0008, r = 0.5965*).  
These results demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between liberal 
democracy and self-direction is not supported if self-direction is defined in very abstract 
terms like thinking up new ideas and being creative. However, if a more specific attitude 
related to self-direction is used, then the testing shows that some degree of congruence 
indeed occurs: in countries where there is more net support for civil rights liberal 
democracy is more developed.  
To complement some of these results, scatter plots were created. Figure 10 (p. 52) shows 
the relationship between the LCI and net support for self-direction. There is one clear 
outlier, Ecuador, which is located far away from the best fit line: while it has a rather high 
score on self-direction, its liberal component score is the lowest. Countries in the upper 
left corner, like Japan, the Netherlands and Estonia, have high scores on the LCI, but low 
scores on the net support for self-direction, which contradicts the hypothesis, and the 
                                                          
6 Conventionally, results are considered to be statistically significant if p < 0.05; statistical significance is 
indicated by the star (*) next to the Pearson’s correlation coefficient.      
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cases are rather scattered around the best fit line. Overall, the scatter plot indicates the 
lack of correlation between variables. Figure 11 (p. 53) shows the relationship between 
the LDI and self-direction.   
Figure 12 (p. 53) presents the relationship between the LCI and net support for civil rights, 
and Figure 13 (p. 54) demonstrates the relationship between net support for civil rights 
and the LDI, which proved to be stronger than the relationship between the LCI and net 
support for civil rights. In Figure 13, Romania and Ecuador might be regarded as outliers; 
if they are removed from the correlation analysis, the strength of an association between 
the LDI and net support for civil rights increases: r = 0.7000*, p < 0.0001. There is also 
scatter around the best fit line, which is reflected in the only moderate Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient, but more cases are located on the best fit line or close to it than on 
Figure 10 and Figure 11. Therefore, it might be argued that there is some correspondence 
between the level of societal support for civil rights as an important democratic 
characteristic and liberal democracy.      
 
Figure 10. Liberal Component Index and self-direction  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
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Figure 11. Liberal Democracy Index and self-direction  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
 
Figure 12. Liberal Component Index and civil rights  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
54 
 
 
Figure 13. Liberal Democracy Index and civil rights  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
3.2.2. Liberal Democracy and Universalism 
To test the hypothesis for the relationship between liberal democracy and universalism 
(H2. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on liberal democracy) Pearson’s 
correlations were run for four combinations of variables. The results are the following:  
- net support for universalism and LCI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 
0.0841, r = -0.3452); 
- net support for universalism and LDI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 
0.1167, r = -0.3153);   
- net support for tolerance and LCI: the result is not statistically significant (p < 
0.0854, r = 0.3309);   
- net support for tolerance and LDI: there is a weak / moderate positive correlation 
between net support for the statement that tolerance and respect for other people 
is an important quality to teach children and the Liberal Democracy Index (p < 
0.0374, r = 0.3953*).   
The results demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
universalism and liberal democracy is not supported when universalism is defined at a 
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very abstract level. There is also no statistically significant relationship between support 
for tolerance towards other people, as one feature of universalism, and liberal component 
of democracy. However, there is a weak / moderate positive correlation between net 
support for tolerance and the LDI.  
In addition to running correlations, scatter plots were produced to illustrate the results of 
hypothesis testing. Figure 14 (p. 55) shows the relationship between the LCI and 
universalism. Ecuador stands out as a clear outlier. Countries that have high LCI, for 
example Japan, Estonia, the Netherlands, Sweden, demonstrate low or average support 
for universalism. There are also groups of countries (for example, Australia, Taiwan, 
Romania) that have different LCI scores, but the same or similar net support scores for 
universalism, which is reflected in the absence of an association. Figure 15 (p. 56) 
visualises the relationship between the LDI and universalism.   
 
Figure 14. Liberal Component Index and universalism  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)  
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Figure 15. Liberal Democracy Index and universalism   
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
Figure 16 (p. 57) demonstrates the relationship between the LCI and net support scores 
for tolerance, and Figure 17 (p. 57) illustrates the relationship between the LDI and net 
support scores for tolerance. The latter relationship is statistically significant in contrast 
with the former one, although the strength of an association is only weak / moderate. 
There is rather a lot of scatter in Figure 17 and Ecuador, as well as Mexico and Colombia 
to a certain extent, stand out as outliers. If Ecuador is removed from the analysis, the 
strength of the association slightly increases: r = 0.4146*, p < 0.0315. Therefore, 
congruence between societal support for tolerance and liberal democracy might occur to 
a minor extent. 
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Figure 16. Liberal Component Index and tolerance      
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
 
Figure 17. Liberal Democracy Index and tolerance   
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
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3.2.3. Egalitarian Democracy and Universalism 
For testing the hypothesis for the relationship between egalitarian democracy and 
universalism (H3. Societies that emphasise universalism score high on egalitarian 
democracy) Pearson’s correlations were run for the following combinations of variables. 
The results are as follows:   
- net support for universalism and EgCI: there is a moderate negative correlation 
between net support for universalism defined as doing good for the society and 
the Egalitarian Component Index (p < 0.0406, r = -0.4042*);   
- net support for universalism and EgDI: the result is not statistically significant (p 
< 0.0642, r = -0.3682);   
- net support for income equality and EgCI: the result is not statistically significant 
(p < 0.2509, r = 0.2244); 
- net support for income equality and EgDI: the result is not statistically significant 
(p < 0.0588, r = 0.3615). 
The results demonstrate that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
universalism and egalitarian democracy is not supported. While there is a moderate 
correlation between universalism defined in abstract terms and egalitarian democracy 
(Egalitarian Component Index), the association is negative, which means that higher 
scores on one variable are accompanied by lower scores on the other. When universalism 
is defined in more specific terms, income equality, the hypothesis is not supported either.  
The produced scatter plots visually demonstrate the relationships between the variables. 
Figure 18 (p. 59) illustrates the relationship between the EgCI and universalism. The 
values are rather scattered, which is demonstrated by only moderate Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. The association is negative, in which countries with high EgCI (for instance 
Japan, Korea, Estonia, the Netherlands) have rather low scores on universalism. The 
opposite is true for countries like Georgia and Ghana, and especially Mexico and 
Columbia. Figure 19 (p. 59) visualises the relationship between the EgDI and 
universalism.    
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Figure 18. Egalitarian Component Index and universalism   
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
 
Figure 19. Egalitarian Democracy Index and universalism   
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)   
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Figure 20 (p. 60) visualises the relationship between the EgCI and net support for income 
equality, and Figure 21 (p. 61) demonstrates the relationship between the EgDI and net 
support for income equality. In both scatter plots, the variables are rather scattered around 
the best fit line, and Mexico and Colombia stand out as outliers in both. Sweden, which 
has the highest scores on both the EgCI and the EgDI, has only average support for 
income equality in comparison to other countries. Poland, which has a rather high EgCI 
and EgDI, has negative net support score in income equality, along with other countries, 
whose EgDI and EgCI scores are lower than those of Poland (for example, South Korea, 
Georgia).      
 
Figure 20. Egalitarian Component Index and income equality  
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)      
61 
 
 
Figure 21. Egalitarian Democracy Index and income equality 
Source: author’s dataset compiled based on the data form the V-Dem dataset, version 8 
(Coppedge et al, 2018b) and WVS 6 results file (“World Values Survey (2010-2014)”)       
3.3. Results of Hypothesis Testing and Possible Explanations 
The three main hypotheses that were formulated based on the theoretical framework were 
tested in four ways each: in combinations of full and component democracy indices with 
abstract values and more specific attitudes. In eight out of the twelve variations of 
hypothesis testing the results were not statistically significant. What is more, even when 
the results were statistically significant, the strength of the association was moderate or 
weak / moderate and in one case the direction of association was negative, which 
contradicts the idea of correspondence between societal values and political institutions. 
Therefore, there is not enough evidence to conclude that congruence between values and 
models of democracy occurs. Closer look at the locations of different countries on the 
scatter plots provides more insights into this.  
Countries like the Netherlands, the USA and Australia, established and stable 
democracies, score rather low on self-direction and universalism, while they have high 
scores in liberal and egalitarian models of democracy, which might suggest that 
congruence between societal values and political institutions might not be a crucial factor 
in ensuring democratic stability, at least in some cases, and that other factors might play 
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a role in this. In contrast to this, Colombia and Ecuador, whose Electoral Democracy 
Index scores reached the level of 0.6 shortly before the survey year and are among the 
lowest in the sample, score higher on self-direction and universalism, but their democracy 
scores are lower, which also suggests a lack of congruence. In the case of these recent 
democracies this could be explained by the fact that congruence takes more time to occur; 
however, since on average the established democracies do not demonstrate high 
congruence between self-direction and universalism on the one hand and respective 
models of democracy on the other themselves, this proposition seems unlikely.  
Another possible explanation for such a difference in scores between some of the 
established democracies and new ones, which would have to be tested in a separate 
research, is that high support for the broad values of universalism and self-direction might 
express aspirations for better quality of democracy (or life in general) in those countries 
where democracy indices are not very high yet. For example, in those countries where 
egalitarian democracy is not well developed and therefore the distribution of recourses is 
not equal, citizens might feel like they need to contribute to society more, while in 
established democracies people may rely on the government to provide social welfare. In 
addition, cultural differences, including in interpreting the questions, are another 
important factor that should be taken into account. The most striking example of this is 
Japan, which has high democracy scores and very low support for self-direction and 
universalism.  
The situation, however, changes when values are operationalised in a less abstract manner 
and when more specific questions are used to represent some features of universalism and 
self-direction. The hypotheses that received some support (association between liberal 
democracy and support for civil rights and liberal democracy and support for tolerance) 
both demonstrate that the expected association is more likely to exist between a less 
abstract attitude and a model of democracy. This result confirms the assumption that self-
direction and universalism might encompass too many attitudes to be connected to 
institutional arrangements, which have specific features. By contrast, the attitude that civil 
rights protect people from state oppression is clearly defined and directly connected to 
liberal democracy. Tolerance is less abstract than universalism, but it might not be as 
specific as civil rights, which may partly contribute to the weaker correlation between 
tolerance and liberal democracy than between liberal democracy and civil rights. 
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There is no statistically significant relationship between support for income equality and 
egalitarian democracy, while the connection between egalitarianism and equal income 
distribution as one of the components of equal resource distribution would appear to be 
logical. Therefore, the question is whether other forms of ensuring more equal resource 
distribution, for example high unemployment benefits, might be seen by citizens as more 
appropriate and legitimate and thus serve as a better way to operationalise an attitude that 
could be linked to egalitarian democracy (and more specifically to equal resource 
distribution).   
Another important question is about the difference between various models of democracy. 
While civil rights play a crucial role in liberal democracy, they are related to egalitarian 
democracy as well, since it strives to ensure equal protection of people’s civil liberties. 
The EgCI in the V-Dem dataset includes an equal protection index, which is related to 
civil liberties. Therefore, although this was not part of the original design, Pearson’s 
correlation was run to check the relationship between net support scores for civil rights 
and the EgCI and the EgDI. The results demonstrate that there is a strong positive 
correlation between both net support for civil rights and the EgCI (p < 0.0000, r = 
0.7629*) and net support for civil rights and the EgDI (p < 0.0000, r = 0.7480*). This 
result raises questions about the essential distinctions between different models of 
democracy in terms of their characteristics and respective values and attitudes that can 
underlie them.   
The fact that more specific attitudes are better correlated with models of democracy also, 
to some extent, seems to be related to the distinction between established and new 
democracies. As was mentioned, countries like the Netherlands, the USA and Australia 
score rather low on self-direction and universalism, while Colombia and Ecuador score 
high on these values. The situation with these countries’ scores on the net support for civil 
rights is different: the Netherlands, the USA and Australia have higher scores than 
Colombia and Ecuador. While a deeper analysis could be done in terms of differences 
exhibited by established and new democracies to see in what cases what specific 
variations occur, these several examples might demonstrate that in established 
democracies, due to the longer democratic experience itself, citizens have undergone 
socialisation into specific concepts like civil rights and thus understand them better and 
value them as an important characteristic of democracy, which this is not the case in some 
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new democracies. If this argument proves to be true upon more detailed research, it could 
support a hypothesis that congruence might well occur in the direction from institutions 
to societal values.   
Post-communist Estonia, Poland, Slovenia and Romania, which are now members of the 
EU, exhibit different patterns among themselves. Romania has the lowest scores on the 
EgDI and the EgCI as well as the LCI and the LDI, while the other three countries have 
better scores. On universalism and self-direction, Estonia scores rather low, and on the 
scatter plots it is located close to the Netherlands. Poland and Slovenia have the highest, 
and similar, scores here among these countries, while Romania is located in between these 
two countries and Estonia. Estonia, Poland and Romania have very high scores on the net 
support for civil rights, similar to those of Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. Estonia 
also scores the highest out of these countries on tolerance; Poland has a high score, while 
Romania’s score is rather low. The location of these countries on scatter plots gives 
insights into the extent to which these countries exhibit patterns similar to those of 
established democracies. Estonian is often located close to the Netherlands, while 
Romania is often located farther away from other European democracies. An interesting 
topic to follow up on with regard to these countries would be the development of illiberal 
democracies in Central Europe, in Poland in particular.        
Contrary to the expectation that correlations might be stronger between values and 
component indices, in the case of two hypotheses related to liberal democracy correlation 
is stronger between scores in values and full democracy indices, which include electoral 
democracy scores. Since high scores on full indices depend on both EDI scores and 
component scores, the correspondence between values and institutional arrangements 
might depend on the quality of electoral democracy as well, at least in the case of liberal 
democracy. If it is assumed that the direction of congruence goes from values to 
institutions, fair elections will serve as a mechanism for choosing representatives who 
will uphold societal values. If it is assumed that congruence runs in the opposite direction, 
commitment of the elites to fair and transparent elections might contribute to the 
formation of respect for civil rights among citizens. What is more, such a result might be 
related to the fact that countries in the sample vary a lot on their EDI scores; in some 
cases, like with certain new democracies, it might mean bringing down their full 
democracy scores in line with their support for more specific attitudes.  
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In conclusion, the congruence theory in its application to the relationship between values 
and models of democracy received mixed evidence and insufficient empirical support in 
this research. When models of democracy are correlated with more specific attitudes 
rather than abstract values, the results show that congruence occurs to some extent. This 
is the case with support for tolerance and liberal democracy, support for civil rights and 
liberal democracy and support for civil rights and egalitarian democracy, with the latter 
demonstrating the strongest correlation, although this relationship was not initially chosen 
for testing. At the same time, universalism and egalitarian democracy demonstrate 
statistically significant relationship, but this association is negative. Such results could be 
related to the operationalisation of variables. To operationalise values, other questions, or 
combinations of WVS questions aggregated into indices, could be used. These in turn 
could be correlated with different sub-indices and indicators that are aggregated within 
the V-Dem to construct component and full democracy indices, which would allow to 
establish more direct connections between values and features of different models of 
democracy. The next, concluding, chapter connects the theoretical framework of this 
research and results of the data analysis and presents some suggestions on how to further 
research the relationship between societal values and models of democracy.          
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Conclusions and Discussion 
This thesis aimed to explore the relationship between societal values and different models 
of democracy. Its objective was to go beyond the connection between self-expression 
values and democracy as such and examine the possible links between other values 
widespread in various countries and specific models of democracy, which put emphasis 
on different features added on top of free and fair elections.  
The idea that there might be such links between values and different institutional features 
of democracies came from congruence theory, which constituted the central part of the 
theoretical framework for this research. This theory posits that stability and successful 
regime performance depends on whether there is congruence, that is similarity or 
correspondence, between governmental authority patterns and authority patterns of 
different social units. In a democracy, this also implies that governmental authority 
patterns should exhibit some non-democratic features to match authority patters of other 
social units, some of which might not be fully democratic. While overall units that are 
less resistant to change adapt to those units that are the most rigid ones (like families), 
there is a possibility of social units adapting to governmental authority patterns. 
While authority patterns imply the relationship between at least two people, these 
relationships themselves might be based on values that are held by individuals; 
institutions in turn might emphasise features related not just to elections or processes by 
which decisions are made, but also characteristics related to social and political equality. 
Therefore, congruence might link not just authority patterns of difference social units, but 
individual values and various principles that are embedded in specific institutional 
arrangements characteristics of different societies. When it comes to democracies, such 
arrangements constitute different democracy models.  
Based on the idea that for democracies to be stable there should be correspondence 
between societal values and models of democracy adopted in different countries and 
taking into account the available data, the three formulated hypotheses posited that self-
direction is positively linked with liberal democracy, that universalism is positively linked 
with liberal democracy, and that universalism is positively linked with egalitarian 
democracy. Since congruence might run in either direction, from social units to the 
government or in the opposite direction, this research made no distinction between an 
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independent and dependent variable. What is more, it should be noted that the broad 
nature of universalism allowed to connect it with two models of democracy, and the 
results of hypothesis testing were expected to show whether universalism has a stronger 
connection with one model or the other. In addition, since individuals might value 
different things and, at the same time, the same country might have adopted features of 
different democratic models, the three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
complementary.        
The three hypotheses were tested using the dataset compiled for the purposes of this 
research. The dataset included 28 countries from different parts of the world representing 
both established democracies, like the Netherlands and the USA, and new ones, like 
Colombia and Ecuador. The selection of the countries for this research was based on the 
sixth wave of the World Values Survey and countries’ scores on the Electoral Democracy 
Index from the Varieties of Democracy dataset. The WVS questions were used to 
operationalise the value concept, which was done at two levels: at a more abstract level, 
using the questions based on Schwartz’s typology, and a more specific level, using 
questions that are related to the features of self-direction and universalism, which in turn 
seem relevant to specific models of democracy. To measure how widespread values are 
in a society, net support scores were calculated a difference between percentage of people 
who support a value and percentage of people who are opposed to it. To operationalise 
models of democracy, countries’ V-Dem scores were used, and this was also done in two 
ways: both respective component democracy indices and full democracy indices, which 
are aggregated on the basis of component indices and electoral democracy scores, were 
used.   
The three hypotheses were tested using Pearson’s correlation, which shows the strength 
and direction of association between two variables. Since congruence means 
correspondence between values and institutions, it was expected that higher support of 
certain values in a society should be accompanied by more pronounced realisation of 
respective democracy models. Therefore, high positive Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
would demonstrate that higher net support for a value is accompanied by a higher score 
in a democracy model, that this relationship is regular and that increase in variables occurs 
at approximately the same pace. 
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The results of hypothesis testing were mixed. Correlation coefficients from running 
Pearson’s correlations between models of democracy and values operationalised in an 
abstract manner (universalism and self-direction) were either not statistically significant 
at all, which does not allow to interpret them, or statistically significant, but negative (as 
was the case with Egalitarian Component Index and universalism, where countries with 
high democracy scores had rather low support for values), which contradicts the 
expectation that high support for certain values should go hand in hand with high scores 
in respective democracy indices.    
The picture, however, changed when correlations were run between more specific 
features of universalism and self-direction and models of democracy. Three coefficients 
were not statistically significant. The correlation coefficient for net support for tolerance 
and Liberal Democracy Index demonstrated a positive weak / moderate association 
between these two variables. The association between net support for civil rights as an 
important characteristic of democracy and both Liberal Component Index and Liberal 
Democracy Index was positive and moderate; the correlation coefficient for net support 
for civil rights and Liberal Democracy Index was a bit higher. In addition, although this 
was not part of the original plan, Pearson’s correlation was run for net support for civil 
rights and egalitarian component and democracy indices, and the results demonstrated a 
strong positive correlation in both cases.  
The obtained results have two important implications. From a theoretical perspective, in 
this research the congruence theory in its application to values and models of democracy 
did not receive substantial support. The different scores and scatter plots presented in the 
analytical part of this research visually demonstrate that some of the established 
democracies have low scores in different values. For example, the Netherlands scores low 
on support for universalism and self-direction, but has high score in liberal and egalitarian 
democracy; similarly, Germany has an average score on support for tolerance, but score 
high on liberal democracy. Therefore, in established democracies, which perform well 
and are stable, congruence does not always occur, according to the received results. This 
might mean that beyond more general congruence between self-expression values and 
democracy as such, other factors influence the choice of features which emphasised in a 
specific country. At the same time, the fact that positive results were obtained from 
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correlating some specific attitudes with models of democracy leads to the second 
implication: the need to explore other possibilities for operationalising variables.  
While Schwartz’s operationalisation is theoretically sound and provides good basis for 
researching values, it might be too general to be linked with institutional characteristics 
embedded in models of democracy. This possibility resulted in including more specific 
questions in this research, and these, at least some of them, indeed demonstrated better 
explanatory power when correlated with models of democracy. Therefore, on the one 
hand, other possibilities for operationalising values should be explored. What is more, the 
fact that support for civil rights demonstrated stronger association with egalitarian 
democracy than liberal one poses questions regarding the definition of different 
democracy models. There might be overlaps between characteristics of different models, 
and civil rights is one example of this. One possible was to deal with this would be to 
further explore different sub-indices and indicators in the V-Dem dataset and match more 
specific attitude with specific features of different models of democracy.      
Another possible direction which the research on congruence between values and models 
of democracy could take is related to the distinction between established and new 
democracies. While this thesis tried to touch upon this theme, it was not its primary focus. 
In general, congruence could be separately researched in these groups of countries and 
then the results could be compared to see whether there are significant variations in how 
congruence links different levels of society. This research, for example, demonstrated that 
some of the new democracies score high in abstract values, but have rather low scores in 
more specific attitudes, which the situations with established democracies seem to be 
opposite. This difference and its possible relation to congruence could be researched 
further, for instance, by means of qualitative research.     
In conclusion, this research in broad terms addressed the question of democratic 
performance and stability by exploring the relationship between societal values and 
different models of democracy. By means of statistical analysis, it looked at whether 
congruence between values and these models occurs in democratic countries, which 
might be an important factor in ensuring democratic stability. While this research 
produced mixed results, and can offer only slight support to this proposition, this topic 
could be explored further by adopting other operationalisation of variables and looking at 
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cases of different countries. The combination of the two approaches can provide better 
insights into whether and how congruence works, and if congruence does matter, such 
research can provide the basis for a better design of institutions for new democracies or 
democratising countries.      
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